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Michel Foucault’s work in the sixties is marked by two important works – The 
Order of Things and The Archaeology of Knowledge – but his research spans further 
topics. Among these, two are particularly interesting: his studies on the history of 
psychiatric thought from the Renaissance to Freud, and his work on literary works, 
which include two essays on Roussel and Blanchot. The psychiatric and literary 
experiences share a sense of being outside, a dehors, to use Blanchot’s expression, and 
each has its own way of doing it. The discourses of mentally-ill people are consid-
ered to be outside of the space of Cartesian reason, that is enlightened and positivist. 
A certain type of literature experiments being outside semantic schemes, as it pushes 
writing to its limits. From these two sides, Foucault experiments with the meaning 
of experiencing difference: the language of the mad and that of literary people are 
two different ways to bring to light an originary language, untamable, that is before 
any taking of the floor – any speaking out – happens. The study of madness, psychia-
try and its history, and in parallel with the study of a certain kind of literature, with 
its respective languages and discourses, meant, for Foucault, understanding what it 
means to be outside of the order of discourse widely considered reasonable.
Keywords: Foucault, language, the history of psychiatry, literature, being outside
1. Introduction
A key difficulty encountered by those who first read Michel Foucault’s works 
in the 1960s was not understanding what type of writing his was, to which order 
of discourse it belonged. Foucault’s writing is “mad,” in the sense that it is outside 
any scientific and literary genre. Was Foucault a philosopher, an essayist, an epis-
temologist, a historian of science, or what else [1]? Putting aside these impossible 
classifications in Foucault’s case, the issue of language – of writing in general and 
of literary writing in particular – represented a “space” that the philosopher found 
hard to define. What type of language did Michel Foucault study? From Madness 
and Insanity: A History of Madness in the Classical Age published in 1961 through his 
lectures at the Collège de France in the early 1970s, Foucault studied the mad, their 
discourses and those delivered by the doctors across five centuries. Both the mad, the 
doctors, and their discourses represent for Foucault an outside and an inside of the 
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orders of psychiatric discourse. The mad is the other with respect to the definition and 
identities established by scientific knowledge, from Descartes onwards. A certain 
literature can push the possibility of language beyond recognized semantic limits, 
outside the orders of discourse of ordinary language.
Certainly, Foucault’s attention to literature is not linked to an interest in writ-
ing, which would be a “shelter for subjectivity” – an existentially subjective inner 
place, removed from the dialectic of relationships – because his archaeology is a 
research that points beyond, outside this same dimension that is itself still much 
too subjective [2]. Foucault’s observations on literature disappear in the 1970s. His 
motivation is not easy to pinpoint, other than Foucault deciding to commit himself 
to the political and genealogical study of the relations between men, as literary 
studies simply were not enough for him. It stands that literature, among all the other 
studies, allowed him to escape from himself, from his books and certain aspects of his 
thought that were too structuralist. Nietzsche, Bataille, Blanchot, Roussel, as well 
as Sade, Mallarmé, Joyce, Kafka, Pound, and Borges were at the core of Foucault’s 
literary passion, of his break with phenomenology and with a certain Hegelian 
French academia of the 1950s, and also with philosophy in general, perhaps [3]. His 
literary studies are not only archaeologies of knowledge, but genealogies too, which he 
attempts, of the historical present, of modernity, of the 1960s.
Alongside this attention to literature, Foucault, already in Dream and Existence, 
Mental Illness and Psychology, and History of Madness, wanted to start exploring 
what had historically been considered different due to it being pathological, from 
a psychiatric point of view. Foucault had to understand what the difference of 
madness, sickness (The Birth of the Clinic), criminality, the difference of what and 
who is disturbing, consisted of. For him, in every disciplinary field – not only in 
psychiatry – there are always attempts at retrieving, identifying, marginalizing all 
these differences. To this day, work is being done to bring them back as an alterity, 
the alterity of the same prevalent reason. In his books of the 1960s, Foucault attempts 
to reconstruct these techniques of bringing back and identification to understand 
why some people are inside a madhouse and others are not.
For Foucault, there are those who know how to speak about these differences 
with care, how to tell about and even paint them. They are painters, poets, a 
handful of philosophers, novelists, some French cultural figures of the 1960s, but 
also earlier, from the end of the 18th century and throughout the 1800s, all the way 
to Roussel, Bataille, Klossowski, and Blanchot. There are those who know how to 
paint the others: Bosch, Velasquez, Van Gogh, Manet, Magritte. Classic and con-
temporary philosophers, sociologists, scientists, doctors, and lawyers have instead, 
failed. This is how the confrontation, − always at a certain distance – between 
madness, difference, sickness, criminality and literature unfolded in the pages of 
Foucault’s books from the 1960s. Here, Nietzsche, Sade, Artaud, Roussel, Blanchot 
have lived, speaking to Foucault about these differences. They effected the possibil-
ity of transgression and resistance, of creating a literary and anthropological space, 
where they are not marginalized – or maybe they are – but without being put in 
a madhouse, at least in the ‘sane’ phase of their lives. The cost of this operation is 
certainly high, even at the literary level, because a certain way of writing entails a 
“tormented” relationship with language and life, that can stray toward a “structural 
esoterism” made of “haughty signs” (Roussel).
As it is known, in The Order of Discourse Foucault explicitly mentions powers 
and dangers, an authentic apprehension that can seize us, concerning the language 
that we speak, which most people do not feel because they use it every day. But 
before reaching 1970, literary studies allowed Foucault to discover that  literary 
writing had, for a long time – at least since Diderot – already subverted the 
linguistic codes of belonging, in a confrontation (which was also political) with 
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the discourses of science, and moreover in a confrontation at a distance with the 
difference of madness, a madness that the discourses of medical knowledge named 
and explained. Not only that, they put it in its place. This is where Foucault draws 
madness close to literature. Some literature is, in fact, a “disalienated madness” [4], 
which cannot be confined to a madhouse, since it is made of “doublings of figures” 
(Roussel). This literary writing was not just a game and a literary experiment. It 
was also, and especially, a way to open up the signs and take them beyond their 
signifying function [5]. This literature was, in the 1960s of Foucault, “the mad-
ness of the outside” (Blanchot), when things can be said, but cannot be thought of 
as they are uttered. An example is Borges’ Chinese Encyclopedia, which opens The 
Order of Things and makes Foucault laugh. But if I speak and cannot think of what 
I say, what am I? If I move in a literary scene (Roussel, Blanchot, Borges, Artaud 
and many others), I am not raving mad. If I am otherwise a normal man, then I am 
anormaux. It is worth repeating that we are on neighboring territories, because the 
two dimensions of mental illness and a certain type of literature are similar only 
for the discourses that they deliver. They are both outside the order of discourse of 
scientific knowledge, although under different titles.
This is how Foucault studied the history of psychiatric thought, from leper 
hospitals to Freud’s research, following a pace of this history that consisted also 
of interruptions, jumps, and sudden forward and backward leaps. In parallel, the 
non-works of literature coincided for him with acts, events/enunciations, where what 
counted was the gesture, not the person that made it, not the author who made it. 
Many were the incomprehensible, unnamable, un-assignable (at least temporarily) 
words in this semiotic horizon. It was almost like the language twisted against itself 
(Joyce). The sign opposed a resistance, and he who knew how to practice it, moved 
to the edge and played on the borders of the outside (Blanchot), because the signs 
that he used could not be immediately recognized. In the face of this word, it is even 
possible that some dispositifs of power can change, because transgression [6] – even 
when only literary (Sade, Artaud, Nietzsche) – can cause a general movement of 
reversal that breaks with the “old.” For Foucault, at the basis of these breaks are 
events, a “solitary movement of singular precociousness” [7]. The switch to history, 
to a collective strategy, is hard, because everything seems temporary, isolated – an 
accident, an event, where the bringing back and integration deployed by the dis-
positifs of power are always right around the corner [8, 9]. It is thus necessary to 
look always, again, for another outside. The work of detachment, what Foucault will 
name sé deprendre, has to begin all over again, both in psychiatric studies and in the 
field of an archeological and genealogical philosophy that knows how to dialog with 
certain literary forms.
2. Notes on reason and madness in History of Madness in the Classical Age
Madness has been the object of many discourses, which Foucault studies and 
divides into periods. In his reconstruction in History of Madness, Foucault claims 
that the mad, at least since the 1750s, had to be excluded and their speech con-
trolled. Only reason can speak and this is how madness is named, identified, and 
circumscribed. Of course, so pigeonholed, madness contributes to define the limits 
of this same reason: it is the exteriority, the outside, the other of reason. In any case, 
only one of them – reason – speaks, speaking also of the other one. And reason 
speaks about itself, about what it is and what it is not, of what others are and are 
not, being the only one entitled to do so. In all these cases, discourse is already an 
instrument in the hands of a power: the power of reason, and a psychiatric power 
too, if only in its early stages.
Mind and Matter - Challenges and Opportunities in Cognitive Semiotics and Aesthetics
4
But how had people spoken until then? According to Foucault, the Middle Ages 
held together the scientific, allegorical, mythological and poetic discourse, as well 
as that of magic and chemistry (alchemy). Again in the Middle Ages, the world had 
long ceased to be a cosmogony, a tapestry where man could read the signs sewn by 
God, because Babylon and its punished sins had rendered everything “opaque.” The 
men who built the Tower wanted themselves too, and not only God, to be able to 
name things. Then like now, it was not a matter of simply designating things, but also 
of creating something, or re-creating something that already existed by designating/
nominating it. We know that God punished the men of Babylon for their arrogance 
and for building that Tower that pointed to the sky. And he punished them by 
making the signs and the traces that He has always left across the world, opaque and 
not immediately legible. Foucault maintains that the medieval men then tried to put 
back together a possible interpretation. Six centuries later, Ferdinand de Saussure 
would write about the arbitrary relationship between the concept and the acoustic 
image. He would note that certain correspondences/transparences cannot be sought 
anymore, because sign, meaning, and the world we refer to are different things, 
and nothing is transparent in these linguistic relationships. To the contrary, we have 
leaps of semiotic atmospheres.
While Medieval people were still convinced that the great jigsaw puzzle of 
opacity could be read through different languages belonging to the same leggenda 
(in the sense of what can be read) [10], the Âge classique imposes itself and imposes 
the singular language of reason, of science, and Cartesian knowledge to  everyone. 
This is how man will start differentiating between scientific, allegorical and 
mythological discourses. Based on these rigorous languages, those with the power 
will be able to start serializing, categorizing, naming, identifying, creating taxono-
mies (maybe we have never stopped doing it), to make other women and men into 
classifiable phenomena. Given this semiotic premise, the mad of the Âge classique 
are all pigeonholed in a template populated with cases of abnormality. According to 
Foucault, a “tragic awareness” of this madness developed since the very beginning, 
that is, in the early Renaissance. Nature could not be trusted anymore, because it 
was suddenly populated by monsters, including the mentally ill, which could come 
out anywhere. In his reconstruction, Foucault claims that that is when the mad, 
the beggars, the vagabonds, the libertines, the blasphemers were all gathered at the 
Hôpital: a lager. It was a social problem: order had to be made. Undoubtedly, that 
Hôpital was filled with chaos: the homosexuals and debauched laid next to the mad. 
However, that was the price to pay to the Cartesian method, when a truth must be 
established that let only the reasonable and rational be free, whereas many and var-
ied persons ended up together in a big hospital. Vagabonds cannot roam the streets, 
even better if everyone moves to the city from the country, because the country 
is still too wild and we must discipline, build the citizen, and create demography. 
Individuals must be controlled in order for them to be sent to the factory to work, 
already serialized, from the 1800s onward.
All the mad, indiscriminately, are empty, negative, and unreasonable [11]. 
Their bodies and minds (spirit) are too entangled and there is no physical cure 
that can go with some moral consolations. In the early Âge classique, this is how 
one could be innocent and should be cured, but chaos reigns and then the same 
innocent individual is guilty and must be punished. Thus, takes place the quick 
shift: reason on one side, madness on the other. Finally, with Pinel and Tuke, 
madness is medicalized, made into a scientific object. The mad are examined as 
if they were  phenomena, in the same way objects are examined. These mad objects 
(which lack the qualities of the rational and reasonable subject) are our “objects”, 
because they are in our “possession” and, as such, belong to us in every sense. 
Then,  perhaps, we lock them in a drawer, but it is something we decide to do. 
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These prisons/drawers are ours: we built them to put in our objects, our posses-
sions, our mad, and our physicians. They are the drawers of our desks, on which 
we compile our archives and note that someone is mentally ill. In Foucault’s recon-
struction, at this point this kind of madness is very close to us, because it teaches 
about us, who are the mentally sane. We know ourselves through this madness, 
that is, through the modalities with which some discourses are made that let us 
know that someone is mad and maybe we, too, are not so well.
Only Freud will begin claiming that there is something profoundly true in the 
mad, which belongs to all of us. Again, Freud will say that there exist some familiar, 
sleeping forms: the same voices for everyone, and strange lights. It is as if the mad 
showed us our youth, being the mirror of the distortions of a civilization that has 
become modern. The instincts, perversions, pain and violence, the selfishness are 
ours. They are our mad side. But before reaching Freud, Foucault reminds us that 
Pinel – who took the important step of declaring that the mad are not monsters, but 
persons in need of a cure – did not free anybody, precisely because he claimed that 
madness is a sickness that must be cured. Pinel as a physician was a man of power 
who practiced a discipline that had its own exclusions, “declassifications,” and 
desk drawers. However, Pinel’s time is already the time of the man-madness-truth 
tryptic; not the time of the truth/errors, world/ghosts, being/not-being, and night/day 
dichotomies anymore. Foucault identifies a three-partite anthropological articula-
tion that ripens in Pinel’s hospitals of the 1800s, on city and country roads, in the 
literary works of all the authors that we have already mentioned. It may be 1961 and 
Foucault is speaking of madness, but The Order of Discourse of 1971 is ready, already.
In any case and to stick with our theme, at the time of The History of Madness 
Foucault attempts straying in the literary field more than once. Diderot’s Le neveu 
de Rameau (1891), whose analysis occupies the introduction of the third part of 
the History of Madness, is a lonely man who makes continuous pantomimes. He is 
vain, full appearance, immediacy. He is a raving man, who interrogates us, even if he 
represents “all the elements that form a wordless dialogue between day and night 
[…] in the burgeoning transcendence of any act of expression, from the source of 
language itself […]” [12]. Roussel, Joyce, Foucault: “He is mad because that is what 
people tell him and because he has been treated as such” [13]. Rameau’s nephew 
is lyrical: he imitates everything, knows all the languages. He is one and nobody 
because he is everyone. He is a man who, in the end, is left on his own, locked up, 
remaining there with an empty smile on his face that will frighten us. Foucault: “To 
be oneself that noise, that music, that comedy, to realize oneself as both a thing and 
an illusory thing, and thus to be not simply a thing but also void and nothingness, to 
be the absolute emptiness of the absolute plenitude that fascinates from outside, to 
be the circular, voluble vertigo of that nothingness and that being […]” [14]. In the 
end, Rameau’s nephew will be an object in the hands of the physicians and his lyri-
cism will be explained and normalized in the medical discourse: his will be an organic 
problem and, as such, medicalized. And yet, like in a concave mirror, this monster of 
a nephew shows what and, most importantly, who is normal. In a short time, Sade 
and Baudelaire will be “declassified” too, because their discourses are perplexing. 
Sade will be classified as a pornographer. He will be identified and taxonomized: his 
work will be considered obscene, perverse, and deviant. The danger that he repre-
sents must be softened, thus he must be locked up and condemned.
Are le neveu de Rameau, Nerval and Hölderlin, Nietzsche and Artaud mad? 
Absolutely not, not in an important phase of their lives, because they have their own 
way to tell their experience, which for Foucault is symbolic. It is almost as if they 
established the sense of how the experience of life is changing in general, between 
the end of the 1700s and the beginning of the 1900s, thus also the experience of life 
of those who really experience madness and, especially, of those who watch and 
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listen to it, deciding whether one is mad, or not. Madness and literature stare at 
each other from their respective sides, experiencing each its non-sense. We are on the 
outermost edge of “two movements of poetic conversion and psychological evolu-
tion” [15], which imply, for Diderot in 1791 and Foucault in 1961, the inebriation of 
sensible things, the enchantment of immediate things, a painful irony, a certain loneli-
ness, that of the neveu de Rameau and his madness that belongs to us. However, 
there is not only Diderot. Let us repeat and anticipate a theme that we will return 
to: Nerval and Hölderlin speak about man’s senseless secret, about “his first morning,” 
a “young light,” a “starting again,” an outdoor (an outside), which is crammed with 
items that are not mediated by any reason and are very attractive. We will return 
again to how these literary experiences happen like a tragic and painful “laceration,” 
even if always in the full light of the possibility that we might start all over again 
(Nietzsche). In short, we are dealing with dangerous experiences: “The moment of 
the Ja-sagen, of the embrace of the lure of the sensible, was also the moment they 
retreated into the shadows of insanity” [16].
The History of Madness was not appreciated by some psychiatrists, who deplored 
that someone could claim that their retreats had an obscure origin in the leper 
hospitals [17]. We have already recalled that, in spite of their merits, according to 
Foucault even Tuke and Pinel cannot be ascribed to a hagiography of psychiatry. 
For Foucault, madness is a cultural product and, for psychiatry, things went one 
way, but could have gone another way, as well: a roll of the dice – as we will see – a 
mode to conceive history marked by unforeseeable events and ruptures, which 
coincided with the birth of the bourgeois society and its ensuing, wide exclusions. 
At the beginning, psychiatry was, with Pinel and Tuke, one of Positivism’s forms 
that corresponded with a sort of apotheosis of the figure of the psychiatrist. In 
Tuke and Pinel’s retreats, a rigorous morality applies, where no diagnoses are made, 
only observations of the behaviors of the sectioned patients. For Foucault, here it is 
all about knowing how to deal with the mad and there is nothing metaphysical in 
the patient-physician relationship, but rather a full-fledged political confrontation. 
Madness attempts to make its voice heard, but science classifies it like as a sickness, 
and achieves this by indulging its moral sensitivity. Since that time, many steps have 
certainly been taken, as we at least have tried to rely on the medicine-verification 
model [18]. Is Foucault an anti-psychiatrist? Maybe. Certainly, mental illness is not 
only a natural occurrence to him; it is also the effect of a specific medical interpre-
tation. Psychiatry advances/imposes such interpretations, which are historically 
based on a power relation with the patients, is a power that makes institutions – and 
not only them – work. And yet, if this is how things stand, if psychiatry was and is a 
power, then its choices can be questioned and subverted [19].
Nevertheless, what procedures do men/women undergo to become physicians, 
as subjects of conscience? Simultaneously, on what basis do men/women become 
patients as objects of conscience? For Foucault this question is not only about 
repressive systems, with respect to which we would be passive, but about processes 
of self-formation: the mentally ill and the sane self-form with respect to the psy-
chiatric power. The same goes for the physician with respect to the patient. It is a 
power fight over yielding the power of delivering a certain type of discourse. Is 
psychiatry willing to ask itself about how its ‘truth’ has affirmed itself through 
history, under sometimes violent circumstances? Does it make a genealogy of its 
historical processes that have led it to, today, deliver certain discourses, which 
profess the truth about who is mentally ill? To work on one’s history effects the 
liberation – albeit partial – of thought, including the psychiatric thought, work-
ing silently on what we think, because those who are defined as mentally ill do, 
indeed, think silently, but the same goes also for the physician who observes the 
patient’s behaviors and listens to his/her discourses [20].
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Let us be clear on this: Foucault’s whole operation in 1961 and then in 1972 with 
the new edition of The History of Madness and then with the two courses at Collège 
de France, Le pouvoir psychiatrique (1973–1974) and Les Anormaux (1975), was not 
easy, because Pinel is not at all bad. He is a physician who stands before the mad and 
tells his assistants that these people are not criminals, nor possessed by the devil, 
nor wild beasts to chain and lock up, but sick people, and it is necessary to treat 
them with care and humanity. But we have seen that for Foucault, Pinel’s progress 
still carries within itself the discursive mesh of a series of passages that reduce the 
other to nothing, but a sick person to cure and, in a Positivist sense, a scientific object 
to analyze like any other phenomenon. We will have to wait for Foucault to read 
Freud and even he will not be enough for the philosopher, because his psychoana-
lyzes are induced self-confessions. In any case, madness remains the result/discard of 
the Cartesian cultural gesture of separating reason from non-reason, being mentally 
sane from being mentally insane. For Foucault, psychiatry does not liberate, it 
excludes. Lepers were too excluded by means of specific rituals of purification. 
They were only one step ahead of the beginning of psychiatry’s history, which was 
grafted onto their historical branch via an event, an Hôpital, a Cartesian distinction 
between being and not being.
Is Foucault’s reconstruction of the history of madness perhaps too ideological? 
Does it wink to Surrealism? Is it too not historical enough, anti-psychiatrist, anti-
Cartesian, and anti-Enlightenment (these are the accusations that were leveled at 
him and that he took in serious consideration) [21]? Maybe, but this is not what 
matters today. What matter are his observations on the discourses of psychiatry, 
powerful discourses that forced many different ones into a silence that stretched 
to Freud’s time, even if, to Foucault, certain tales of the self (the dialog and the 
psychoanalytic encounter) look a lot like self-surveillance. In any case and at every 
moment in history, psychiatric time needs its own microphysics, which is only 
possible starting from the discourses that the psychiatrists make and let others 
make, or not: from a psychiatric point of view [22], society, power and normality are 
important stakes. Is Foucault anti-psychiatrist, post-romanticist, and an idealist? 
Foucault signaled a discursive shift: the mad’s discourse, which was silence, was 
replaced with the medical discourse, a kind of “transcription” of madness in the 
language of mental illness. This affects us, if nothing else, for all the times we speak 
of medicalization, a concept that touches us throughout our lives, from the moment 
of birth to that of death.
We know that in the 1970s and 1980s Foucault sought a return to the Aufklärung 
beyond its historical limits: a critical, archeological, and genealogical return to the 
time of the Luminares, because a different life is possible, because, if anything, the 
Greeks and the Romans, at least some of them, before the Christians, led lives that 
were ethically different from our present ones. But what kind of shift did Foucault 
attempt? Are not his Aufklärung and his critical detachment themselves constitutive 
of a new scene, with all the limitations that it entails [23]? Regardless of how we 
want to answer this question, already by 1961 Foucault had described a “madness 
of not madness,” in the non-sense of a reason, a knowledge, and a medicine that 
impose themselves as dispositifs of power with catch-all pretenses. Then, next to it, 
we are left with the impression that the sense that we attach to things derives from 
a non-sense, which is of the world and of the same men and women that attempt to 
give meaning to themselves, walking on an abyss, the abyss of the non-sense that they 
find themselves facing.
For Foucault, let us repeat it, power and knowledge can constitute themselves in a 
moment, and therefore at the beginning of any time there is a roll of a dice, an empir-
ical dimension that is necessary and not transcendental. There has never been, for 
Foucault, a transcendental subject. There was never a man, a woman, that had been 
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always made in a certain way and would be like this forever. There has always been 
and there will always be a man and a woman of knowledge and power, who change 
at each historical passage and some passages are, as we were saying, a roll of the dice. 
This is where we run along the edge of the abyss, that is also connected with what 
might happen: Nazism, Fascism, the lagers, the atomic bomb, the “madness of not 
madness” taken to their limits. And yet, they are the mad ones, the people that we 
cure, medicalize, and confine in the madhouses. In Italy, Basaglia, first in Gorizia 
and later in Trieste, began opening some psychiatric hospital in the same years that 
Foucault was conducting his studies, from the end of the 1960s through the 1970s. 
Basaglia’s operation was not easy, especially for the families of the liberated mad, 
who were again hit by their relatives’ non-sense of the sense.
3. Why literature
Foucault writes for La Table Rond, Tel Quel, Nouvelle Revue Française. He writes 
a book on Raymond Roussel and the introductions of other literary works. In the 
1960s, Foucault makes his incursions in the world of literature, where he finds 
confirmation, among other things, about his notion that language precedes us 
(Blanchot), a language that is an outside (la pensée du dehors, the precise and famous 
expression di Maurice Blanchot) that envelops us. Our word is not the beginning. 
It is not at the beginning. For Foucault/Blanchot, it is a certain surrealism, a certain 
aestheticism of the beginning of the century that matters.
In The Order of Things, the Renaissance, was for Michel Foucault, a time marked  
by a way of understanding language as governed by relationships of similarity and anal-
ogy: the inner microcosm corresponds to the macrocosm of the world via analogies, one 
resembling the other in the semiotic universe of the Renaissance. With the Baroque, 
these relationships of similarity are left behind and a crucial shift happens, as language 
is now considered a mathesis that allows things and names to be divided up and linked 
in a clear and distinct way. Then, in the 18th century, the signifier-signified relationship 
becomes problematic once again: a caesura intervenes between words and things. In 
any case, language has for a long time, since the Renaissance, lost its relation of similar-
ity with something enigmatic, primitive, and shining, which coincided with an infinite 
opening up to the world. Foucault claims that no traces remain of that language today. 
This moment is when a certain literature that has its own semantic autonomy – not 
unlike a counter-discourse without representative pretenses – emerges, in a space other-
wise dominated by scientific discourses. With it, a language that pulsates, that lives and 
breathes, makes its appearance once again with Hölderlin, and, for Foucault, Mallarmé 
and Artaud, who are the first among the others to engage with this language [24].
Let us now move, then, to Foucault’s 1960s France and recall something we are 
now familiar with, that is, that Blanchot and Bataille intended language as a form of 
negation, a passage that Foucault appropriated. Blanchot and Bataille claimed that a 
refus, una dépense had to be opposed to an omnivorous dialectic of the philosophers, 
because things must be consumed for a real expenditure of energy (not only semantic 
ones). By doing so, one does not see goals and aims for themself. It could be that 
in this literary context – and not only in it – it is necessary to also work on psychic 
automatisms, like the Surrealists did, since it is possible to be manifold individuals 
without a definite identity. Certainly, according to Foucault [25], we should not 
apply a psychological reading to works of art (like Jaspers did, for example [26]) 
because that would end up, if nothing else, twisting van Gogh’s art. Foucault notes 
[27] that if we want to adopt a psychological lens, then we should say, with Lacan, 
that the originary language, which brought together madness and reason, is always 
there, within us, even after reason and madness have been separated. And yet, 
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since some rational limits have been set up, that language has trouble making itself 
heard. For many, it does not exist anymore, and thus, there is no possible accom-
modation, no exchanges, no communication between the madness of some and the 
so-called work of others (for example, some psychiatrists). Madness is the absence 
of work and so is some literature. Are Van Gogh’s paintings works? In Foucault’s 
reading they are not and this is not because van Gogh cut his ear off, but because his 
works, his paintings, represent a break with all that precedes them in a historical 
and dialectical sense. Van Gogh and his paintings mark an inaugural event.
Moving with Foucault to an exclusively literary side, Hölderlin, in his time, 
already resisted. Hölderlin resisted through his poetry, a poetic resistance, infused, 
however, with a divine violence that illuminates and incinerates [28]. We are with 
Foucault and the Hölderlin that he reads, at the limit. Blanchot (whom Foucault 
will follow almost to the letter), also reflected on Hölderlin, and wrote in La 
parole sacrèe de Hölderlin, in the book La part du feu [29], about a literary journey 
to an inner reality that can be in a relationship with what is sacred, here following 
Heidegger’s lesson on silence. For Blanchot, this literary inner reality – and not only 
that – coincides with nothing reassuring, as its experience suspends the world and 
the self. Blanchot observes that, in Hölderlin, all this takes on an ambiguous and 
dangerous appearance, because it is like we are waiting for the dawn and the song 
of the Gods, while, at the same time, facing the loss, the ruin of the self ’s word. 
As we have repeatedly pointed out, even if these are not experiences of madness, 
they are nevertheless painful dimensions that are difficult to hold, being at the 
very edge of what others would treat medically. We can, therefore, consider them 
as forms of alienation. The literary experience is a path that can be tread, which 
can lead to a new Zarathustra. Its journey and its outcomes too are painful, almost 
unbearable, and in any case they are not an experience for everyone. This is the 
origin of the clear political limits of such a proposal, the missed switch from 
individual experience to collective sharing, even though Nietzsche clearly changed 
the course of history, at least for a certain part of the Western world.
For Foucault, the fragmentary and incomplete nature of Nietzsche’s writings 
represented the rapture and the shedding of the unitary system of so-called 
works founded on scientific discourses. For Blanchot, the work that Foucault 
mentions with Nietzsche, remains instead, albeit transformed, open, infinite, 
unfinished: Hölderlin, Nietzsche, and later Kafka and Mallarmé testify to it. 
Blanchot identifies an anchor in the unbridgeable gap between Hölderlin and 
Nietzsche’s literary experience and their respective madness. He believes that 
Hölderlin paved the way for a new genre. Hölderlin announced the possibility to 
dissolve the artist’s subjectivity, moving toward something deep that could not 
be reduced to the orders of the discourse of scientific knowledge, toward a non-
dialectical dehors that is an originary dimension. For Foucault, the dehors entails 
moving to a metaphysical void. For Blanchot, the dehors is a space, where one can 
play at differing the meaning of the words that one uses, if they know how to do 
it. Such words, if put down in a certain way, help one to put themselves at a small 
distance from reality and the world as they are given to us.
If we return our focus to Foucault, in the span of a few years, his positions will 
progressively adjust and, from Non du père to La pensée du dehors, they will move 
closer to those of Blanchot in a clearer and more definite way. Foucault detects a 
void, an absence, in language, what precedes the speaking out. Between 1963/64 and 
later, after 1966, in Préface a la trasgression [30], the introduction to Bataille’s work, 
a certain way of doing literature becomes, for Foucault, a transgression of the limit, 
without being a Dionysian experience anymore, with no relationship with madness. 
In La folie, l’absence d’ouvre of 1972 [31], Foucault pronounces the definitive death 
of the homo dialecticus and between his death and the liberation of language we go 
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from Nietzsche to Freud and finally Blanchot. Freud, in any case (and for Foucault 
in 1972) does not in fact consider the language of madness a deraison, but a reserve 
of meaning. It is not simply silence anymore, but a doubled-up word, folded on itself, 
with double meanings that go beyond the linguistic surface. According to Foucault, 
Freud reflects on an esoteric language, a code that loops back on itself. It is an absence 
of work, where one cannot be univocal. Perhaps, this is how, Freud and Foucault 
claim, we can disclose a certain closeness between literature and madness, thanks 
to these features that are essential to any linguistic code [32]. But, in reality, Freud, 
Blanchot, Mallarmé, and Foucault align on a new front. Because if Freud discovered 
the hidden meanings of language, Mallarmé took the same language to an originary 
dimension, which is not madness anymore for both of them, but a shared and 
originary dimension. Thus, under the sign of a certain interpretation of language, a 
new union is established not between madness and literature, but between a certain 
way of practicing psychoanalysis and literature. Here with Foucault we get close 
to Heidegger and Blanchot once again, acknowledging that language is something 
originary, a dehors, something that before speaking out is unrestrained, because it is 
an origin that we cannot dominate.
Roussel, Mallarmé, Bataille, Blanchot accompany Foucault in his archaeologies 
of this language, at least for some time. But let us ask once again: why this focus on 
language? Certainly, Lacan’s lesson, among the others, had its importance. But why 
Lacan? Because Foucault is interested in his psychoanalysis [33], a psychoanalysis 
that can look beyond the dimension of representation, proceeding in the direction 
of the limits of man and his being “finite.” Death, Desire, Law-Language are the 
three keywords/cornerstones of Lacanian psychoanalysis. For Lacan, language is 
not a free expressive capacity. It is a “law” that governs man’s thought and action, 
beyond their conscience and active mechanisms. This is where Foucault’s research 
establishes the point of welding between literature and madness that we have been 
looking for. Let us read, then, Bruno Moroncini’s words: “In other words, if I start 
reading a text by Maurice Blanchot (or Raymond Roussel, or Georges Bataille, 
or a poem by Mallarmé), what kind of experience am I having (in the sense of 
the Erlebnis of the phenomenological tradition, or the philosophy of life)? Am I 
experiencing the contents that have progressively accumulated in the subject and 
that are communicated to us in a nice form, or is it the experience of language 
as language, that is of that Language-Law that cannot be separated from Death 
and Desire, to which psychoanalysis leads us in its approaching the reason of the 
unconscious and of finitude?” [34].
Whether it acknowledges it or not, the I speak is inside a language that can 
spread itself infinitely. Raymond Roussel and Edgar Allan Poe know it: if you know 
how to play, this language can lead you to the infinite on its surface, breaking 
you, dispersing you, scattering you in a “naked” linguistic space. But one must 
pay attention, because this infinite spreading also concerns some discourses. These 
discourses, which purport to tell the truth on people and things, infinitely search 
for a truth, a certainty, a definition, that does not exist and has never existed, all 
the while counting who is in and who is out. In such cases, the I speak is a “crack” 
through which other, specific outsides form – the various “outsides” of the discourses 
of truth, the ones that are full of rules that exclude: the prohibited, the partage [35]. 
All these linguistic phenomena express a will of power. They are dehors the  
discourses that idealize reality – like the juridical and historical ones.
Madness too inhabits this dehors/outside of language, but it does it in its own way, 
a very difficult way to interpret. Death, the dark sides, the unsaid of discourse have 
their own I speak that we need to be able to listen to. It is not enough to label them 
as “mad”, because they are not. They make up an important part of us and, in the 
end, are neither good, nor bad. There is, thus, let us say it once more, a sharing of 
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a wild territory from different sides, a looking at it from different shores that must 
be kept separated: that of literature and that of mental illness [36]. In Blanchot 
[37] and Foucault’s case, this wild dimension could, for some years, correspond 
to one of the findings of an archaeology of silence, a silence that once had a voice. 
For Blanchot, his dehors is not madness, but a way to distance oneself from reality 
and the world. It is an outside that is a sign that wanders the world and develops 
itself in a constant deferral. For Foucault, literary language is a language of literary 
fiction, which weakens the discourse of the Cartesian subject. Then there are other 
types of fiction, like those Bentham reflects on [38], but here we get to Discipline 
and Punish of 1976, almost ten years later and they are linguistic and symbolic 
 fictions  discussing the power relations and, perhaps, even the prison’s architectural 
 structure. In any case, the thread that goes from Blanchot to Bentham remains. 
In the end, almost at the end of the 1970s, Foucault will visit Japan where he will 
discover a different theater, even a different ars erotica, that will lead him to think of 
another semiotics, a semiotics of the scene, of the ceremony, of the ritual, of martial 
arts, all of them disciplines of the body that are different from those of the West. 
But this is a different story for a different paper [39].
Going back to the 1960s, literature was, for Foucault, transgression, resistance, 
contestation, a questioning of dialectics and of those who profess it. At that 
time, contestation could still realize itself, not only in politics, but in a literary 
space going from Sade to horror novels. Literature is a pretext, something non-
historiographical that comes before the text, is not an academic discourse, and does 
not follow a method. The book dedicated to Raymond Roussel is Foucault’s “secret 
garden.” His step toward politics is drawing near, while at the same time still far 
away, because, in these years, Foucault practices mostly, not really an esthetic, nor 
a hermeneutics, but a philosophical-literary study standing between history and 
non-history, semiotics and noise, which is an archeology that is useful to take a step 
back and oppose those who adopt a strictly scientific method, thus counting who 
speaks and does not speak [40].
This switch is not easy, we have already said this. Poe, Roussel, Blanchot split 
words. They embed them in different codes, from which the paradox can originate 
of a word that says what it says, while adding a mute surplus, that shows, almost 
silently, not only what it says, but also the code and codes that allow it to speak. 
In such a way, we move inside the existential folds of the word, where some words 
do not have a single meaning and what counts is not their verbal matter, but the 
game they play and the transgressions that they allow. These words do not hunt the 
truth, because they are not confessions, neither in Augustine’s way, nor Rousseau’s or 
Freud’s. Here, for Foucault, we need a poet’s talent, since writing, at the time of the 
first edition of the Archaeology of Knowledge, is something we lose ourselves in, we 
step back from, we play with, whereas the subject of knowledge of the same poetry 
must be destroyed and vanishes, since there are no authors anymore when we write 
and read (from Kierkegaard to some variants of the structuralism of the time). In 
any case, for Foucault some books are interesting, because, as you write and read 
them, you cannot say where they will lead you and they thus teach you what you do 
not know. These books are inventions that can transform those who write and read 
them. They can be real events.
Coming to the end of this review of Foucault’s literary studies, let us insist 
again that a certain structuralism and the Heidegger of Being that manifests itself 
in language – as well as Nietzsche, Bataille, Canguilhelm, Lacan, Levi-Strauss, 
certainly Blanchot – have had an impact on Foucault’s research, inducing him to 
believe in a language that precedes any scientific discourse. Literature admits this 
anteriority, it traverses it, opens itself to it and lets it flow, something that, at that 
time, the Nouveau Roman in France had been teaching for a long time. Literature 
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grasps and practices an originary language and if someone expects to find their 
identity in this semiotic experience, then they will not. Writers, those who try to 
study language formally (the Russian formalism and more) [41], those who study 
the myths (Levi-Strauss), or those practicing a certain psychoanalysis (Lacan), all 
know it. The language that they contend with imposes to the self, not so much to 
keep quiet, as to retreat, if it expects to engage in discourses intending to represent 
the truth of something. It is a matter of stepping outside the discourses that make 
dialectics and existentialism, the same structuralism, and listening to a different 
way of saying things.
This is how we can again create an opening (Heidegger), allowing the same 
language to spread itself infinitely, certainly in a void of words, for those expect-
ing to say the truth. In this void, the signs come together, but they are also kept 
apart, because it is like they are dispersed, without a space that would let man and 
woman fold on themselves to seek their own truth. The language, that Blanchot 
experiments with, takes things to their limit, because it is a self-contestation, a void 
of consciousness, inside the noise of language, where words go after one another 
indefinitely, overcoming the same literary fiction. Raymond Roussel had allowed 
Foucault in 1957 to break with phenomenology. Foucault will then read Blanchot, 
Bataille, and finally Nietzsche, in an almost exclusively literary procedure with a 
sui generis philosophical outcome [42]. For him, language will then be a non-place, 
made of uncontrollable similarities, a neutral space where nothing can root, no one 
speaks, where all has already been said in a different and often ungraspable way. It is 
not easy to claim all this: it stands on the border of madness’ territory.
In 1983, Foucault will declare that there exists a writing of the self, which has been 
practiced, following a certain old, pre-Christian morality. This writing of the self 
does not coincide with an obligation of truth that runs the risk of going on forever 
exhaustingly and without a real care of the self. Then, in Greece and Rome, we had 
journal entries, notes of quotations, soul searching, and correspondences, treatises, 
in a relationship with friends and teachers. But here we are beyond literature. It is 
1981–1982 and these are the lectures on L’herméneutique du sujet, where Foucault 
reflects on a possible new ethical site that has, in fact, been possible A site, where 
man can transform himself, test himself, can take care of himself without being a 
subject who wants to know the truth, without establishing differences and plac-
ing outside and inside a madhouse, a prison, at the margin of society, those who 
have a different sense of things that does not coincide with the order of the discourse 
of Power.
4. Conclusions
This brief reconstruction of the important and complex themes of madness and 
literature in the philosophy of Michel Foucault shows that, in Foucault’s analysis, 
they are neighboring territories. Both of them lay outside the prevailing order of 
discourse, experiencing the non-sense of the words that they pronounce, enunciate, 
and live. Finally, each plays its own game. Or, to better explain, if those who create 
literature may perhaps want to play with words, those who are put in a madhouse do 
not play anymore. Probably, they really are ill, but it can also happen that they have 
been labeled anormaux by those who have the power to do it and, then, reduced 
to silence and forbidden to wander (Nietzsche) the streets of the cities and the 
towns, or the country, that were once their home. Both madness and literature are 
dehors/outside. They are exposed to an outside, which is the outside that they live, 
because they found themselves excluded from the games – left out of them – or 
chose to keep away from them. Next to these two outsides, are the many outsides 
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of the discourses of Power and of those who purport to tell the truth, which are 
outsides to those who pronounce and those who promulgate them, and to whoever is 
left outside of this network of power from which they have been excluded.
Let us repeat it once again: madness and literature occupy neighboring  
territories in Michel Foucault’s philosophy and it is not right to overlap them. 
The madness of Nietzsche and van Gogh, the suicide of Roussel are painful. They 
are not a game, but real illnesses, or, in one case, the outcome of a possible form 
of depression. They must be clearly separated from the pages, or the paintings, 
which each of the three has, respectively, put together. Before falling ill or taking 
his life, Nietzsche, van Gogh and Roussel, experienced philosophy, painting and 
literature and their possible non-senses. The two different outsides that we have 
attempted to outline in Foucault’s works go together in their lives, but only in 
succession. Foucault urges us to listen to and read their words, to look at some 
paintings, because another world is possible, whereas the one in which we live is 
made of discourses that purport to tell the truth for everyone. These true dis-
courses, taken to their extreme consequences, can go into infinity, until they twist 
on themselves in the experiences of Nazism, the lagers, the atomic bombs released 
on two harmless Japanese cities. Here too, no one plays anymore, but reduces to 
death and silence those who do not believe their truth, their discourses, some 
orders of discourse imposed by a Power that, in history, coincides with an event, 
which corresponds with a roll of the dice that cannot be calculated in advance and 
that can appear again under new guises, which are themselves sudden and immea-
surable, just as terrible, mad, outside our scope and the scope of our life.
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